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2 SURVEY SECTION
Judgments. Allstate Insurance Co.v. Lombardi, 773 A.2d 864
(R.I. 2001). A party may not obtain relief from a judgment con-
firming an arbitration award petition in an independent action if
the party's own unexcused negligence led to the entry of judgment,
even if there was an otherwise meritorious defense to the confir-
mation petition.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Peter Lombardi (Lombardi or appellant) was injured as a re-
sult of a two-car accident.' He was a passenger in one of the vehi-
cles and sued the driver of the other vehicle for negligence. 2 That
driver's insurance company 'went into receivership while Lom-
bardi's lawsuit was pending.3 Allstate insured the vehicle that
Lombardi was riding in for underinsured and uninsured motorist
(UIM) coverage. 4 Lombardi requested UIM coverage from All-
state, but after unsuccessful negotiations he demanded arbitration
of his claim, pursuant 'to the Allstate insurance policy.5
Prior to the arbitration hearing, Allstate offered Lombardi the
policy's limits, $25,000.6 Lombardi rejected the offer.7 He sought
prejudgment interest, in addition to and in excess of the policy
limit.8 On August 5, 1992, an arbitrator awarded Lombardi
$40,000, plus $29,000 in interest.9 Following the arbitrator's rul-
ing, Allstate tendered Lombardi a check for $25,000; on its face,
clear wording indicated that the check was a final settlement for
all claims resulting from the accident for the UIM coverage. 10
Nevertheless, in November of 1992, Lombardi petitioned the
superior court for a confirmation of the arbitrator's award." Lom-
bardi had already negotiated the check given in final settlement of
the claim.' 2 In January of 1993, that confirmation hearing was
1. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lombardi, 773 A.2d 864, 866 (R.I, 2001). The accident
occurred on May 30, 1986. Id. at 866.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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held.. 3 The court entered an order confirming the order in Febru-
ary, 1993.14 Allstate was not represented at the hearing, though
Allstate's arbitration attorney had been notified. 15 An amended
order was entered in July 1993, indicating credit for the $25,000
Allstate had previously paid.16 The initial confirmation order, the
amended order and the judgment indicating the terms were all
served on Allstate's arbitration attorney. 17
More court action followed. In March 1994, an execution of the
judgment was issued at Lombardi's request.' 8 In November of
that year, Lombardi filed a debt-on-judgment complaint for ap-
proximately $46,000 after Allstate refused to give more than the
$25,000 already tendered. 19 In December 1994, Lombardi re-
quested an entry of default because Allstate had failed to answer.20
In January 1995, before the judgment was entered, an attorney
entered his appearance for Allstate and Allstate answered. 2' On
appeal, Allstate suggested both that the confirmation petition inac-
tion was a result of multiple firms handling different aspects of the
claim, and that the illness and 1998 death of Allstate's arbitration
attorney constituted excusable neglect for not opposing the confir-
mation petition.22
In March 1995, Allstate filed an independent action in which
they sought relief from both the arbitration award confirmation
and the debt-on-judgment default. 23 Allstate made several asser-
tions in its complaint that the judgment was a nullity because
money in the amount of the policy's limits was offered before the
arbitration, Lombardi accepted a check for the policy's limits, Lom-
bardi negotiated the check and the language on the check indicated
that it was for the final settlement of the claim.24 Allstate also
contended that they had not been served with notice of the action,
13. Id.
14. Id. at 867
15. Id. at 866-67. The record indicates a copy of the cover letter to the clerk of
the court was served upon Allstate's attorney. Id.
16. Id. at 867.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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and that, in any event, Lombardi could still recover additional
damages as a result of the pending litigation with the driver of the
other vehicle.26
The confirmation action, the debt-on-judgment action and the
relief from judgment action were consolidated into the Allstate ac-
tion, and the matter was brought before the Rhode Island Supreme
Court.26 Lombardi filed motions for summary judgment on the
debt-on-judgment action and Allstate's relief action.27 At the hear-
ing on the motions for summary judgment, Allstate admitted "that
it had received notice of the confirmation proceeding, that the con-
firmation petition had 'got lost somewhere' during the interim...
and that it had made 'a glaring error' by not responding to the peti-
tion or opposing the confirmation of the award."28
Allstate did not argue at the trial level that its attorney's ill-
ness and death constituted a reason for vacating the judgment. 29
No evidence was introduced by Allstate to substantiate the claim
that the illness and death had an effect upon any of the actions. 30
Allstate did not make a showing of excusable neglect or the ab-
sence of negligence on its part.3 ' Instead, Allstate argued that the
decision was void as a result of the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
decision in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Pogorilich,32 which was ren-
dered while the arbitration proceedings were ongoing.3 3 Allstate's
attorney admitted that the award was never contested because of
"'inadvertence of prior counsel'" and "'remiss lawyering"' as well
as because of the assumption that the appellant would not seek
confirmation of an award with, in light of the Pogorilich decision,
"'no legal relevance.'" 34
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 867-68.
29. Id. at 868. Apparently, there was a verbal indication to the trial court that
Allstate's arbitration attorney died in 1998, but that was years after the arbitra-
tion award and confirmation action had concluded. Id.
30. Id. An unsigned affidavit of the arbitration attorney that was allegedly
prepared in 1995 made no mention of any kind of illness or incapacity. Id.
31. Id.
32. 605 A.2d 1318 (R.I. 1992).
33. See Lombardi, 773 A.2d at 865, 868.
34. Id.
2002]
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The trial court denied Lombardi's summary judgment mo-
tions.35 The judge on the motion calendar ruled that the Pogorilich
decision rendered the arbitration award void because that case es-
tablished that Lombardi could only recover the limits of the UIM
policy from Allstate ($25,000), an amount concededly paid.36 Fur-
ther, she noted that that decision was issued prior to the arbitra-
tion award.37
Following that reasoning, Allstate moved for summary judg-
ment on all of the actions; the same motion judge granted the mo-
tions and ruled the award void because it was contrary to the
holding in Pogorilich.3s Final judgment entered in the consoli-
dated cases in favor of Allstate.39
On appeal, Lombardi's position was that Allstate was negli-
gent in not raising the Pogorilich issue at either the arbitration or
confirmation proceeding. 40 Allstate had decided not to defend it-
self and it should not have been allowed to obtain relief after the
fact when it had negligently failed to raise those arguments "at the
proper time."41 For those reasons, Lombardi contended, the judge
erred in voiding the judgment.42
That position was refuted by Allstate. Allstate argued that
the judgment was, in fact, a nullity because the policy's limits was
offered and accepted in final settlement of the UIM claims. 43 Sum-
mary judgment was appropriate because of the settlement and the
availability of recourse against the driver of the other vehicle for
other damages. 44 Allstate continued with its argument that it
lacked notice of the confirmation proceeding.45
It was conceded by both parties that there were no material
facts to dispute and that the motion judge's sole task was to deter-
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 869.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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mine if Allstate was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law.46
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Rhode Island Superior Court
Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may seek relief from a judgment
by filing an independent action.47 Specifically, Rule 60(b)(4) allows
relief from a judgment that is void. 48 An erroneous judgment does
not necessarily make the judgment void.49 Errors of law are not
grounds to vacate a judgment as void, except when the court has
no jurisdiction or the actions are "a plain usurpation of power con-
stituting a violation of due process."50 Fraud and collusion are also
reasons that judgments may be void or voided.5 ' A default judg-
ment is void if no notice is given to the opposing party.52 An erro-
neous judgment may only be attacked directly, which makes it
different from a void judgment, which may be attacked via an inde-
pendent action.53
"[Riegardless of whether the Superior Court erred on the mer-
its when it entered a judgment that confirmed the arbitrators'
award of prejudgment interest in excess of the Allstate's policy's
limits, Allstate may not obtain relief from such a judgment merely
because the... [clourt may have committed a legal error."54 The
methods to challenge that alleged error were by opposing the con-
firmation petition or directly appealing the award at the confirma-
tion proceedings, but despite notice, Allstate negligently failed to
take advantage of those avenues for relief.55 The court held that
the trial justice erred in ruling that her earlier judgment was void
46. Id. (citing Superior Boiler Works, Inc. v. R.J. Sanders, Inc. 711 A.2d 628,
631-32 (R.I. 1998)).
47. Id. (citing Raymond v. Koszela, 473 A.2d 281, 285 (R.I. 1984)).
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing Jackson v. Medical Coaches, 734 A.2d 502, 506 (R.I. 1999) (per
curiam) (quoting 11 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 2862, at 326 (2d Ed, 1995)); Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1995)).
50. Id. (quoting Hoult, 57 F.3d at 6).
51. Id. (quoting Medeiros v. Hilton Homes, Inc., 408 A.2d 598, 601 n.2 (R.I.
1979)).
52. Id. (citing Medeiros, 408 A.2d at 601 n.2).
53. Id. (citing Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645,
649 (1st Cir. 1972)).
54. Id. at 869-70.
55. Id. at 870.
20021 529
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because the arbitration award contained prejudgment interest.56
Even if she had not ruled it void and the judge had been in error by
confirming the award, that type of error would not make the judg-
ment void via a Rule 60 motion or independent action.57
Lombardi also complied with the applicable statute concerning
the entry of an order confirming such an award. 58 Lombardi com-
plied by serving a cover letter and confirmation petition, as well as
serving notice of the hearing, on Allstate's arbitration attorney.59
There was no evidence in the record to suggest excusable neg-
lect or a lack of actual notice.60 Statements of counsel on appeal
are not evidence and not part of the record, thus statements on
appeal in support of the excusable neglect and notice arguments
could not be entertained. 61 The record did not indicate that All-
state's attorney was ill, or when he became ill, nor did Allstate ar-
gue to the lower court that the death or illness of the attorney
constituted excusable neglect. 62 There was nothing in the record
to suggest that the attorney was suffering from terminal cancer at
the time of the confirmation petition, nor was there anything in the
record to suggest any evidence to believe the claim had been set-
tled.63 Allstate "relied solely on the vague, conclusory, unsworn,
and unsupported statements of its counsel on appeal to plaster
over all the cracks, crevices, and gaping holes in the porous eviden-
56. Id. At this point, the court paused to clarify the misconception that All-
state had concerning its prior holding in Pogorilich:
Contrary to Allstate's contention, this Court's ruling in [Pogorilich] does
not stand for the proposition that an that an arbitration award cannot
include prejudgment interest in excess of the limits of an insured's unin-
sured motorist (UIM) coverage. Rather, all that Pogorilich held was that
when arbitrators have been asked to decide the amount that the injured
parties are to recover from the tortfeasor, the uninsured motorist carrier
for the injured parties cannot be required to pay more than the policy
limits of the coverage. But when the arbitrators have been asked to deter-
mine the amount ... to recover from the UIM insurer, then the arbitrators
can award prejudgment interest in excess of the policy limits.
Id. at 870 n.2 (citations omitted) (italics in original). Thus, by relying on the
Pogorilich decision, the motion justice was herself committing error. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-3-11 (1956)).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 871 (citing Wood v. Ford, 525 A.2d 901, 903 (R.I. 1987); State v.
Brown, 258 A.2d 273, 275 (R.I. 1969)).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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tiary foundation for its independent relief-from-judgment petition
it slapped together for the Superior Court."64 The review of a sum-
mary judgment award considers the issues that were properly
presented to the lower court and a party may not raise new issues
on appeal to secure a reversal.65 Allstate's attorney submitted no
sworn factual rebuttal and that neglect was imputed to Allstate.66
The court noted that it was important that Allstate was on no-
tice for the award confirmation, because there may have been
merit to Allstate's claim that the receipt and negotiation by Lom-
bardi of the check indicating final settlement was, in law and fact,
final settlement of the claim.67 Rhode Island accepts the widely
accepted common law rule that, when there is a dispute about the
amount of debt owed, the creditor's taking of a check for less than
the amount claimed extinguishes the debt.68
Allstate's awareness and subsequent negligence by failing to
act was fatal to its independent action in equity seeking relief from
the earlier judgment.69 The traditionally required elements that a
party seeking relief from judgment in an independent equity action
must show are (1) a judgment that because of equity or good con-
science should not be enforced, (2) a good defense to the claim, (3)
some fraud, accident, or mistake that prevented giving the defense,
(4) the absence of an adequate remedy at law and (5) "'the absence
of fault or negligence on the part of the defendant. '"' 70 Equitable
relief is traditionally limited to those who come before the court
with "clean hands."71 Allstate admitted to its own negligence by
not opposing the confirmation petition, admitted its 'glaring error'
by not responding to the petition and failed to show any evidence
in the record that could create excusable neglect on its part. 72
Allstate could not satisfy the required elements for bringing
an independent action in equity and the judge erred in vacating
64. Id. at 871-72
65. Id. at 871 (citing Ludwig v. Kowal, 419 A.2d 297, 302 (R.I. 1980)).
66. Id. (citing Ludwig, 419 A.2d at 303-04).
67. Id. at 872.
68. Id. at 872 n.4 (citing 1 Henry J. Bailey & Richard V. Hagedorn, Brady on
Bank Checks: The Law of Bank Checks § 4.12 at 4-40 to 4-41 (rev. ed. 1997)).
69. Id. at 872-73.
70. Id.at 873 (citing Clark v. Dubuc, 486 A.2d 603,605 n.3 (R.I. 1985) (quoting
Paul v. Fortier, 366 A.2d 550, 552 (R.I. 1976))).
71. Id. (citing Opie v. Clancy, 60 A. 635, 638 (R.I. 1905); Carteret Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Jackson, 812 F.2d 36, 39 (1st Cir. 1987)).
72. Id.
2002]
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the original judgment. The lower court's summary judgment in
favor of Allstate was vacated and the case was remanded so that
all judgments in the consolidated cases would be entered in favor
of Lombardi. 73
In dissent, Justice Bourcier would have allowed a challenge to
the judgment, even if the judgment was not void.74 Rule 60(b)(5)
would have been an appropriate way to get relief from the judg-
ment. 75 Relief from a judgment pursuant to that rule "is appropri-
ate where the limit of a policy has already been paid in final
settlement of the underlying claim."76 In this case, there was no
dispute that Lombardi accepted a check that expressly released
Allstate from further liability beyond the policy's limits. 77
Further, Allstate adequately rebutted any alleged negligence
because "it explained that its arbitration attorney... died after the
arbitration hearing ... concluded and that, as a result, it never
received actual notice of the confirmation proceedings and the vari-
ous orders... Lombardi... sent to the deceased attorney's office in
time for Allstate to object . . . or . . . to oppose . . . or to ap-
peal ... "78 The dissent noted that the motion judge decided cor-
rectly, but for the wrong reason; suggesting that the reasoning
should have focused on "that it was 'no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application.'"79 Because the
Rhode Island Supreme Court may affirm a decision on different
grounds from that of the trial judge and Allstate was entitled to
relief, Allstate was entitled to summary judgment in its action in
equity.80 It was inappropriate to deny relief "simply because the
motion hearing justice gave the wrong reason for doing so.","
CONCLUSION
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Lombardi, the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court held that relief is not available, via an independent
action, to an insurer merely because the lower court judge may
73. Id.
74. Id. at 876 (Bourcier, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 877.
76. Id. (citing Vaughan v. Mut. Ins. Co., 702 A.2d 198, 206 (D.C. 1997).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting R.I. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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have committed legal error; a judgment is not void solely because it
may be erroneous. Because the insurer was on notice of a hearing
on the confirmation of an arbitration award that included prejudg-
ment interest and no evidence establishing excusable neglect was
in the record, the creditor was entitled to the full arbitration
award, despite the negotiation of a check for the policy's limits. In
doing so, the court clarified its earlier decision in Pogorilich. Fur-
ther, an independent action in equity may not be entertained when
the party seeking relief does not come to the court with "clean
hands."
Stephen P. Cooney
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Judgments. Webster v. Perrotta, 774 A.2d 68 (R.I. 2001). Entry of
a default judgment constitutes a concession of all well pleaded alle-
gations of liability, however, it is not considered an admission of
damages. Also, a police officer's salary, wages and benefits
awarded pursuant to statute cease when he or she is no longer an
active member of the police force. Furthermore, prejudgment in-
terest is only awarded to police officers when the town is acting in
an enterprise or proprietary manner.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiffs are former officers of the Johnston Police De-
partment who sought wages and benefits from the date of their
respective retirements.' Each plaintiff voluntarily retired from the
force because of illness or injury suffered or contracted in the line
of duty.2 At the time of their retirement, there was a valid and
enforceable provision in their union contract stating that all mem-
bers of the police department who are injured or contract illness in
the line of duty are statutorily entitled to benefits. 3 This statute is
often referred to as the Injured on Duty provision.4 However after
retirement, the plaintiffs received pension payments that were less
1. Webster v. Perrota, 774 A.2d 68, 71 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. The Injured on Duty provision provides, in pertinent part:
Whenever any police officer... of any city, town, fire district, or the state
of Rhode Island is wholly or partially incapacitated by reason of injuries
received or sickness contracted in the performance of his or her duties, the
respective city, town, or fire district, or state of Rhode Island by which the
police officer.., is employed, shall, during the period of the incapacity, pay
the police officer... the salary or wage and benefits to which the police
officer.. .would be entitled had he or she not been incapacitated, and shall
pay the medical, surgical, dental, optical, or other attendance, or treat-
ment, nurses, and hospital services, medicines, crutches, and apparatus
for the necessary period, except that if any city, town, fire district, or the
state of Rhode Island provides the police officer... with insurance cover-
age for the related treatment, services, or equipment, then the city, town,
fire district, or the state of Rhode Island is only obligated to pay the differ-
ence between the maximum amount allowable under the insurance cover-
age and the actual cost of the treatment, service, or equipment. In
addition, the cities, towns, fire districts, or the state of Rhode Island shall
pay all similar expenses incurred by a member who has been placed on a
disability pension and suffers a recurrence of the injury or illness that
dictated his or her disability retirement.
R.I. Gen. Law § 45-19-1 (2001).
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than 100 percent of the salary, wages and benefits that they would
have received had they not retired.5
In 1997, the plaintiffs sued the town for recovery claiming that
they were entitled to 100 percent of the salary, wages and benefits
that they would have received had they not retired.6 A fourth
plaintiff claimed that he was owed the same amount of compensa-
tion; however his claim was based on a collective bargaining agree-
ment.7 During the litigation the town failed to comply with
discovery orders and the superior court issued a default judgment
in all four cases pursuant to Rule 37 of the Superior Court Rules of
Civil Procedure.8 The default judgments were deemed final, and
they mandated the town to immediately pay 100 percent of the sal-
ary and benefits that each plaintiff would have received as an of-
ficer of the Johnston police department.9 Each judgment was also
scheduled for a proof of claim hearing to determine the amount of
money that the town owed the plaintiffs. 10 Incidentally neither
the complaints nor the final judgments included a claim or finding
that these plaintiffs, from the time of their voluntary retirements,
remained active members of the police department."
Shortly after their entry, the town sought to vacate these final
judgments pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) of the Superior Court Rules of
Civil Procedure for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect. 12 The superior court denied these motions. 13 At the con-
solidated oral-proof-of-claim hearing the town made a second mo-
tion for the judgments to be vacated or modified in order to
comport with the provisions of § 45-19-1 and the pronouncements
of the supreme court.14 The town sought relief from the judgments
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), (5) and (6). 15 The hearing justice found
5. Webster, 774 A.2d at 72.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 73.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Rule 60(b) states in part that:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party
or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceed-
ing for the following reasons (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excus-
20021
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that the defendants failed to satisfy the burden imposed on them
by Rule 60(b)(1)-(6). 16 Furthermore the justice stated that law of
the case precluded him from "second guessing" other justices of the
superior court with respect to legal determinations made by
them.17 When dealing with the proof of claim issues, he rejected
the town's argument that attacked the language in the judgments,
in that they suggested that the computation of damages required a
thorough and detailed analysis of the scope and purposes behind
section 45-19-1 and the pronouncements of the supreme court.' 8
The hearing judge was persuaded that the language of the final
judgments was controlling.19 He held that the provisions with re-
spect to the calculation of damages agreed upon in a previous stip-
ulation was controlling.20 Finally, the hearing judge denied
plaintiffs' request for prejudgment interest, finding that the town
was clearly acting in a governmental capacity as opposed to a pro-
prietary one.2 ' Both parties appealed. 22
The defendants alleged that the judgments were void, arguing
that the judgments should have been vacated and modified be-
cause they exceeded the scope of section 45-19-1 and are applied to
individuals who are no longer active members of the department,
contrary to the previous pronouncements of the supreme court and
the legislature. 23 The town also argued that its motions to vacate
able neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrep-
resentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise va-
cated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospec-
tive application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable
time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation.
R.I. Superior Ct. R. Civ. P. 60 (b).
16. Webster, 772 A.2d at 73.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 73-74.
19. Id. at 74.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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or modify the judgments should have been granted because the
judgments were based on an incorrect conclusion of law and an er-
roneous interpretation of Chester v. aRusso.24 Finally, the defend-
ants urged the court to revisit the holding in Chester and clarify
whether that case is applicable to voluntary retirement. 25 Alterna-
tively the town argued that the hearing justice erred by failing to
conclude that § 45-19-1 and the previous pronouncements of the
supreme court controlled the proper measure of damages at the
hearing on oral proof of claim. 26 On cross-appeal, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that the denial of prejudgment interest was error because the
plaintiffs' action against the town was one in contract. 27
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The supreme court held that although labeled final, the judg-
ments entered upon the default of the defendant were merely con-
clusive in that they established the liability of the defendants as it
related to the allegation in the complaints. 28 The court states that
all language purporting to set forth the measure of damages was
null and void.29 The court also noted that it is well established in
the jurisdiction that a default judgment does not concede the
amount of damages, nor may this type of judgment include the
measure of damages. 30 A party's default is deemed to constitute a
concession of all well-pleaded allegations of liability, however a de-
fault judgment is not considered an admission of damages. 3 '
Therefore, although the plaintiffs are relieved of the burden of es-
tablishing liability in this case, they nonetheless bear the burden
of establishing the damages they are entitled to recover.32 Fur-
thermore the court held that the litigation was not terminated be-
24. Id. Chester v. aRusso, 667 A.2d 519 (R.I. 1995) (holding that when there
exists a valid and enforceable collective-bargaining agreement whose terms pro-
vide greater disability benefits than is afforded by special legislation, the collective
bargaining agreement trumps the special legislation).
25. Webster, 774 A.2d at 74.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 75.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 75.
31. Id. at 77. (citing Greyhound Exhibitgroup Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Reality Corp.,
973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992)).
32. Id.
2002]
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cause the case was ordered to a hearing on the plaintiffs' oral proof
of claim.33
Examining the complaints, the court held that three of the
plaintiffs' complaints alleged that the named plaintiff contracted
illness or injury in performance of his duties.3 4 Additionally under
section 45-19-1 the plaintiff was entitled to salary, wages and ben-
efits that he would have been entitled had he not been incapaci-
tated, and that the defendants have refused to make payments
required by law.35 A second count alleged that at the time the
plaintiff ceased working as a full time officer a collective bargain-
ing agreement was in place, which entitled him to receive benefits
pursuant to section 45-19-1.36 Finally, a third count alleged that
the defendants' failure to recognize the previous decision of the su-
perior court amounted to bad faith. The court held that this allega-
tion amounted to a conclusion at law and had no relevance in a
default judgment, thus was a nullity.3 7
Plaintiff Ferrante filed the fourth complaint and the court held
that this complaint was completely devoid of any allegations that
would support relief in this case and had no relevance to section
45-19-1, thus the judgment for this plaintiff was null and void.38
This complaint made no mention of section 45-19-1 or that the
plaintiff was on Injury on Duty status, but only stated that the
town failed to afford plaintiff benefits of a disability retirement. 39
Finally, the court concluded that the trial justice erred in failing to
examine the pleadings to determine whether the plaintiffs were le-
gally entitled to recover the relief awarded in this case.40 The
court also held that pursuant to the supreme court's examination,
the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief awarded in the
judgments. 41
Regarding the motions to vacate, the court held that according
to the language in the complaints, plaintiffs Webster, Riccitelli and
Bolton were entitled to compensation governed by section 45-19-1
33. Id. at 75,
34. Id. at 77-78.
35. Id. at 78.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 79.
41. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
and previous pronouncements of the supreme court.42 However,
the court held that an officer who is no longer a member of the
police department is not entitled to the benefits provided by section
45-19-1 or the collective bargaining agreement. 43 Regarding the
Chester decision, the court held that this case had no bearing on
the plaintiffs' entitlement to damages, and any contrary holding is
overruled." Chester stated that collective bargaining agreements
could take precedent over an act of legislature when it provides
greater disability benefits.45 The court held that Chester was a
case of statutory construction, and never addressed the applicabil-
ity damages granted to retired officers' pursuant section 45-19-1.46
Regarding prejudgment interest, the court held that prejudg-
ment interest would only be awarded against a municipality on a
breach of contract claim where the municipality acts in a proprie-
tary or enterprise capacity. 47 Here the court held that the defend-
ants were acting in a governmental manner thus cannot be
awarded the interest.48 Furthermore, because no plaintiff has al-
leged that he was a current member of the collective bargaining
agreement unit, they were unable to pursue a claim through the
grievance process. 49
In Justice Flanders' dissent, he argued that Rule 37 of the Su-
perior Court Rules of Civil Procedure should be interpreted
broadly to permit the court to enter a final judgment for a defen-
dant's discovery violation. 50 Furthermore this justice stated that
Rule 37 can and often does award damages and other relief to the
non-defaulting party pursuant to the well-pleaded allegations of
the complaint. 51 On this same subject, the dissent stated that be-
cause this was a final judgment, the defendants should not have
been able to assert the voluntary-retirement defense because the
42. Id.
43. Id. at 79-81.
44. Id. at 82.
45. Id. (citing Chester v. aRusso, 667 A.2d 519 (R.I. 1995)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 82.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 83-84 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 83.
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entire theory of default centered on the notion that the defaulting
party has forfeited liability.52
The dissent also asserted that Chester specifically dealt with a
retired police officer who was no longer employed by the town,
however, the Chester court still awarded him benefits under sec-
tion 45-19-1. 53 Furthermore, Justice Flanders stated that under
Chester, there is no indication that contemporaneous employment
is a precondition of recovery under section 45-19-1.54
Regarding the pre-judgment interest, the dissent argued that
breaching employment contracts with police officers and/or their
union is not an exercise of police power, and in turn not a govern-
ment function. 55 Justice Flanders argued that the appropriate in-
quiry is whether the activity at issue is one that a private person or
corporation would most likely undertake.56 In this case the dissent
held that employment contracts do fall into this category. 57
CONCLUSION
The court held that plaintiffs Webster, Bolton and Riccitelli,
who claimed compensation pursuant to the provisions of section
45-19-1, are entitled to receive compensation from the town for all
periods during which they were actively employed and were enti-
tled to a paycheck. Each plaintiff was owed 100% of the salary and
benefits he was receiving up to the date of voluntary retirement,
and these cases were remanded for a new determination of dam-
ages. The judgment for the plaintiff Ferrante who made no claim
under section 45-19-1 was vacated in its entirety and remanded for
trial. Finally the plaintiffs were denied their prejudgment interest
because the defendants were acting in a governmental capacity.
Camille A. McKenna
52. Id. at 84-85. (citing Calise v. Hidden Valley Condo. Ass'n., 773 A.2d 834,
839 (R.I. 2001)).
53. Id. at 86.
54. Id. at 87.
55. Id. at 87.
56. Id. (citing Housing Auth. of Providence v. Oropeza, 713 A.2d 1262, 1263
(R.I. 1998) (quoting DeLong v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 583 A.2d 75, 76
(R.I. 1990))).
57. Id.
